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The Chinese telecommunications industry has attracted considerable interest in recent years. Much of this interest
has, however, focused on issues such as the growth of the industry, its structure or how it is regulated. The anticompetitive behavior of incumbents, however, has largely been overlooked. This article addresses this oversight by
focusing on the incumbents’ suspected anti-competitive behaviors within the Chinese broadband telecommunications market. In doing so, the key role of the June 2001 Circular in shaping operator behaviors within the
broadband telecommunications market is highlighted. From the analysis it is clear that the incentive of anticompetitive behaviors exists in the Chinese broadband market structure that was created through restructuring and
June 2001 Circular, and that anti-competitive strategic behaviors of the incumbents are suspected to have occurred.
The Chinese government does not have at its disposal, or has not implemented, measures to counter or deter this
type of behavior.
Keywords: China, telecommunications, broadband, anti-competitive behavior

Volume 28, Article 36, pp. 611-628, June 2011
The manuscript was received 5/24/2010 and was with the authors 5 months for 2 revisions.

Volume 28

Article 36

Anti-Competitive Behaviors in Managed Competition: The Case of China’s
Telecommunications Industry

I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of broadband, with its wide-ranging socio-economic benefits has been widely acknowledged
[Benkler, 2010; ITU, 2003 and 2007; OECD, 2009]. So that these benefits can be maximized, governments have
sought to promote the diffusion and adoption of broadband through encouraging the development of competition,
supporting infrastructure investment, and educating would-be users [Benkler, 2010; Howick and Whalley, 2007; ITU,
2003]. Since the early 1990s China has been introducing competition into its telecommunications industry, with
enhancing competition being a long standing policy objective [Tan, Foster, and Goodman, 1999; Xu and Pitt, 2002].
Central to this policy has been a series of industry-wide restructurings that have culminated in the Chinese
telecommunications industry being centered around three large operators. These have been complemented by
regulatory interventions, often in the form of Circulars, which provide rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities
or their results as normative documents issued by a ministry or jointly by ministries. While these changes have
collectively contributed to the rapid growth of the telecommunications industry at large, this study finds that the
policies implemented subsequent to the June 2001 Circular have nonetheless failed to promote competition in the
broadband sector. As a result, a gap exists between official pronouncements and the reality that occurs on the
ground. The key issue here is that the market structure that has emerged after the industry-wide restructuring has
created two vertically integrated, regionally dominant incumbent operators that are able to act anti-competitively
against new entrants, while the Chinese government does not have at its disposal, or has not implemented,
complementary measures to counteract or deter this type of behavior.
Although this type of anti-competitive behavior of incumbents may take many forms, it is derived from their structural
position in the marketplace. The fixed incumbents are monopolists in the north and south of China; they control the
international gateways as well. This means that new entrants are required, to a lesser or greater extent, to use the
assets of the incumbents to deliver their own services. Control of these assets provides the incumbent operators
with the means of forestalling the development of competition through, for instance, refusing to trade, charging
higher prices, or degrading the quality of necessary inputs required by new entrants. It is this relationship,
overlooked by previous academic research, between the incumbent and new entrant, that has important implications
on broadband development, not least on convergence between the telecommunications and broadcasting industries
that the Chinese government has sought to encourage by organizing a series of trials since January 2010. In order
to explore this relationship, the remainder of the article is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides an overview
of the Chinese telecommunications industry, drawing attention to the successive rounds of restructuring and the
notion of “managed competition” within the industry. This literature review highlights that the alleged anti-competitive
behavior of the incumbents under the managed competition that emerged after the separation of regulation from
operation has been overlooked in the analyses that have been undertaken. The focus then shifts to broadband in
China in Section 3, as the circumstances leading up to issue of the June 2001 Circular are recounted. Section 4
investigates the implications of the resulting market structure, while Section 5 looks at its impact on the broadcasting
industry. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.

II. MANAGED COMPETITION
Until 1993 telecommunication services in China were the preserve of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT). Within the Ministry, telecommunications services were delivered by the then Directorate General of
Telecommunications and its Provincial Telecommunications Administrations. As a consequence, the Ministry was
simultaneously both regulator and service provider. In 1993 companies not affiliated with MPT were permitted to
enter the value-added services market, with one of the most prominent providers, Ji Tong Communications, making
its market debut in January 1994. Shortly afterward, in July 1994, China United Telecommunications Corporation
was founded with a full service license [Xu and Pitt, 2002; Fan, 2005]. These changes represent the introduction of
competition into the Chinese telecommunications industry.
Starting in 1998, a series of changes were made to separate regulation and service provision from one another. In
1998 the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) assumed the regulatory role of MPT, with service provision being
transferred to four state-controlled operators in May 2000. China Telecom received the fixed assets, and China
Mobile the mobile operations, whilst satellite became a separate business under the name China Satellite. Paging
was transferred to China Unicom, which focused on the mobile industry after being incorporated in 1994. This was
an effort to create, through managerial focused actions, a more level-laying field for China Unicom to compete
against China Mobile [Xu and Pitt, 2002].
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However, as can be seen from Table 1 (below), another round of restructuring was implemented just a few years
later in 2002. In this restructuring, the fixed assets of China Telecom were geographically separated. China Telecom
retained the assets of the southern provinces as well as 70 percent of the national and international trunk
operations, with the rest of the company being transferred to China Netcom [Fan, 2005]. After this restructuring,
there were six operators: China Telecom, China Unicom, China Railcom, China Satellite, China Mobile, and China
Netcom. Interestingly, not all of these were present in all possible lines of business, with the consequence that
markets were regional near-monopolies in the fixed line market and nationwide duopolies in the mobile sector, a
managed attempt to mix homogenous and heterogeneous competition [Fan, 2005]. The significant exceptions were
Internet backbone services with five operators present, and Internet access services with a typical oligopoly
consisting of the above uneven nationwide operators and a fringe of many small dial-up or broadband nonnationwide providers. What has happened in the market for Internet broadband access is the focus of this article.
Table 1: Major Developments in the Restructuring of the Chinese Telecommunications Industry
Year
Development
1993
 China Ji Tong initiated
1994
 China Unicom established
1998
 MPT replaced by Ministry of Information Industry (MII)
 China Telecom restructured
2000
 China Telecom, China Mobile and China Satcom established
2002
 China Telecom restructured geographically. Since it remains dominant in the fixed
network in the southern provinces; and China Netcom in the northern provinces
2008
 Industry-wide restructuring leading to the consolidation of the industry around three
companies announced and started: China Mobile, China Unicom and China
Telecom
 MII became part of Ministry of Industry & Information Technology
2009
 2008 restructuring aforementioned completed
 3G licences awarded to China Unicom, China Telecom and China Mobile
Source: compiled by the authors
The third and most recent restructuring of the Chinese telecommunications industry occurred in late 2008 and early
2009. China Netcom was dissolved and its assets transferred to China Unicom, which in turn retained its GSM
business but sold its CDMA operations to China Telecom. China Mobile acquired China Railcom, and China Satellite
became part of China Telecom [MIIT et al., 2008]. As a result of this third round of restructuring, the Chinese basic
telecommunications service industry is centered around three large operators—China Unicom, China Mobile and
China Telecom—that were all granted a third-generation mobile license in January 2009. Just prior to this round of
restructuring, the newly established Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) absorbed the regulatory
functions of MII in June 2008.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the successive rounds of restructuring outlined above, as well as the growth of the
Chinese market more generally, has attracted the attention of researchers. Reflecting the scope of the
telecommunications on the one hand and its pivotal socio-economic role on the other, the research is wide-ranging
in character. It ranges from an exploration of the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and equipment
manufacturing within China [Tan, 2002] to an empirical investigation into the productivity of operators within China
[Lam and Shiu, 2008], and how the digital divide that has emerged within China is being tackled [Xia and Lu, 2008].
Other research has explored the interplay between regulation and market structure, and as such is of greater
relevance here. Gao and Lyytinen [2000], for instance, adopt a “macro perspective” to investigate the reform
process within China. After arguing that telecommunications reform needs to be placed within the broader context of
economic and political change, they show how changes to both the regulatory regime and market structure have
been enacted over a number of years, through the use of administrative methods on the one hand and the adoption
of a “act after trials” approach on the other hand. In this approach, changes are trialed before more far-reaching
changes to regulation and market structure are made. Zhang [2002] identifies both formal and informal institutions
within China’s telecommunications industry. The mixture of formal and informal institutions complicates the already
complex policymaking environment that exists within the Chinese telecommunications industry.
A broad perspective is evident in Loo [2004], who proposes a three-fold analytical framework in order to understand
telecommunications reform. The framework contains the concerns of the government, pressure from foreigners and
market forces. The application of this framework enables Loo [2004] to illustrate how the drivers of
telecommunications reform have changed over time. Prior to the start of telecommunications liberalization in 1994,
state concerns dominated though market forces were becoming stronger. Between 1994 and 1997,
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telecommunications reforms were driven less by state concerns and more by foreign pressure and market forces.
The balance between the three factors also shifts in the next period identified, which runs from 1998 to 1999.
Foreign pressure was probably the dominant factor over these two years, though market forces were also influential.
Less noticeable was the continued presence of state concerns, as evident in the continued state control of the
largest operators. In the final period identified, 2000 to 2004, the influence of foreign pressure declined while state
concerns reasserted themselves, along with market forces, to shape the development of the industry. If we were to
update the analysis to cover the period since 2004, it is arguably the case that reforms in China have been driven by
market forces and state concerns.
The heightened influence of foreign pressure in 1998 and 1999 corresponds to the period just before China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Zhang [2001] links the restructuring initiated by MII
shortly after it was created with the need to enhance the competitiveness of Chinese companies prior to the full
liberalization of the market that was promised as part of the WTO accession negotiations. In addition, China’s entry
into the WTO also contributed to the swiftness with which the changes were enacted. It is worth noting, however,
that Zhang [2001, p. 473] states that the restructuring of China Telecom has had only a limited impact on promoting
competition, and it is questionable whether the competitiveness of China Telecom and China Unicom have been
enhanced as a consequence of the government’s “managed competition” policy.
Managed competition is one of the issues raised by Owen et al. [2008] in their wide-ranging discussion of the AntiMonopoly Law in China. They argue that the key competition policy issues faced in China are linked to the country’s
transformation from a centrally-planned to a market economy. Some people in China argue that limiting excessive
competition rather than enacting and enforcing the Anti-Monopoly Law should be prioritized in China. Owen et al.
[2008] counter this argument, noting that the examples raised are not ones of there being too much competition but
rather examples of competition gone awry. Two additional issues identified by Owen et al. [2008] are the role of
state-owned enterprises and administrative monopoly. They use the restructuring of the telecommunications
industry, which saw the break-up of a single state-owned entity into several that competed against one another, to
illustrate how the government has sought to introduce competition into a variety of markets. Having said this, Owen
et al. [2008] then go on to assert that although this restructuring successfully broke-up the monopoly provider the
amount of competition that resulted was often very limited.
Li [2009] also considers competition within the Chinese telecommunications industry, though from a different
perspective than Zhang [2001]. Li explores whether the restructuring of telecommunications industry within China
contravenes the country’s Anti-Monopoly Law that took effect in August 2008. As chapter five of the law addresses
the use of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, Li argues that, as the most recent restructuring of
the industry was made through administrative power, it is anti-competitive in nature. She does not discuss the anticompetitive behaviors of incumbents. Interestingly Li [2009, pp. 368f] suggests that for a variety of reasons the AntiMonopoly Law will not have an impact on the telecommunications industry, and, as a consequence, its role needs to
be revisited in the future. Like Owen et al. [2008], Zhang and Zhang [2007] contend that the enactment of the AntiMonopoly Law is a significant step forward. However, they cast doubts on its overall effectiveness since two issues
remain unresolved. One of these issues is the enforcement structure, while the other is the nature of administrative
monopoly. Taken together, it is questionable whether the enforcement agencies of the Anti-Monopoly Law will have
either the power or capacity to apply the law to the administrative monopoly created by the government that protects
several sectors, telecommunications included.
This literature on China’s restructuring of its telecommunications industry focuses on the restructurings, the structure
of the market both before and after the restructurings, and nationwide operators. But little of the literature touches on
the suspected anti-competitive strategic behaviors within the market structure created by the restructurings. Only
materials directly related to the incumbent’s anti-competitive behaviors were originally reviewed by Xu, Pitt, and
Levine [1998]. It was later elaborated in Xu and Pitt [2002]. In the sole chapter on the entry of China Unicom, Xu and
Pitt [2002] discuss the barriers raised by the incumbent and regulator alike in the 1990s with regard to
interconnection between China Unicom and China Telecom’s fixed and mobile arms. Significantly, Xu and Pitt [2002]
only identified issues among national operators. These issues were addressed through the separation of regulation
from operation in 1998 and the separation of China Mobile from China Telecom in 2000. Though Yu et al. [2004]
identified some instances of unfair competition after the 1998 reform, they touched on only those among national
operators in terms of interconnection between operators and cross-subsidy between services of the same operator.
In this article, we identify and then critically evaluate the suspected anti-competitive strategic behaviors of the
incumbents in the broadband access market within the context created by the restructuring of the industry and its
regulation. The dominant and vertically-integrated nationwide operators are suspected of, in standard industrial
organization theory terminology, foreclosing, that is, excluding, those non-dominant and non-national operators who
rely on purchasing inputs from them. Through examining these behaviors, which involve non-dominant and nonVolume 28
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national operators, this article sets itself apart from previous research and thus contributes to the ongoing debate
regarding the structure and regulation of the Chinese telecommunications industry.

III. JUNE 2001 CIRCULAR
Competition within the telecommunications industry is identified by Fan [2005] as being one of the key determinants
of Internet affordability and availability within China. It is argued that through restricting the Internet services that
operators can provide, backbone competition was limited. As a consequence, it was expensive for Chinese Internet
Service Providers (ISP) to access the Internet internationally. For instance, China Telecom charged $73,000 per
month for 2Mbps in 1998 compared to $50,000 in Australia and $22,000 in the United States [Fan, 2005, pp. 199f].
The high cost of Internet access as well as poor service quality caused users to complain [Harwit, 2008; Zhao,
2000].
Although the issue of high costs began to be discussed in early-1999, it was not until 2000 that a Circular was
issued that substantially reduced the cost of a series of Internet products [MII et al., 2000]. This Circular reduces the
prices of dedicated lines. The dedicated lines could be used in the feeder and distribution sector, which connects an
exchange to a converging point where the lines of all subscribers in a (or couple of) real estate property
management area (REPMA) converge. This price decline encouraged ISPs to provide broadband access services
[Harwit, 2008].
Since Internet service had been classified as a value added service with lower policy barriers, the period from late
2000 until mid-2001 saw the establishment of competing ISPs, resulting in such strategic behaviors: Incumbent and
non-incumbent commercial Internet interconnection operators (which are called Category A operators in this article),
as well as new entrants not licensed to operate commercial Internet interconnection services (Category B
operators), sought to monopolize the provision of broadband on a REPMA by REPMA basis. Although the 2000
Circular reduced prices, the strategic behaviors of both types of operators “resulted in the duplication of
telecommunications networks, left a lot of resources unused, wasted a lot of funds, and even impeded
telecommunications security” [MII, 2002].
The primary policy response to the aforementioned duplication that was subsequently described by the MII was the
June 2001 Circular. Neither Yu et al. [2004], Fan [2005] nor Harwit [2008], or any one else for that matter, refer to
this Circular, which is surprising given the structure that it has imposed on the Internet in China. The June 2001
Circular—The Circular of Undertaking Trials of Opening Markets of Network of Residence—sought to clarify the
regulation of broadband telecommunication services, determining that it was a form of basic telecommunication
service and limiting Category B entrants to the drop sector in thirteen cities. Of these thirteen cities, three—Beijing,
Jinan and Qingdao—are in the north where China Netcom (now China Unicom) was dominant after geographical
restructuring in 2002 while ten—Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Xiamen,
Chongqing, and Chengdu—are in the south where China Telecom is the incumbent operator. Category B entrants
are not allowed to build any new drop sectors outside these thirteen cities, nor are they allowed to build any new
feeder and distribution sector networks anywhere in China (including in trial cities) [MII, 2001]. Due to this restriction,
Category B entrants are required to rely on the incumbents and other Category A entrants for their interconnection,
even with the domestic Internet backbone. The nature of such trial activity relating to this Circular makes our
discussion and its possible consequences all the more important, given that policymakers in China broadly followed
what Gao and Lyytinen [2000] described as “act after trials” approach.
The market structure that emerged after the June 2001 Circular is shown in Figure 1. This figure highlights the
limited scope of Category B operators: they are limited geographically to just thirteen cities as well as operationally
to the drop sector and thus have to seek interconnection with, or purchase inputs from, Category A operators in the
feeder and distribution sector in order to connect with the domestic Internet backbone. In contrast, all Category A
operators are legally allowed in both the feeder and distribution and drop sectors, though two of them—regional
incumbents in Category A, that is, China Telecom in south and China Netcom (now China Unicom) nearly
monopolize the drop sector, and are the largest provider in distribution and drop sector in either of regions. Category
A operators could be divided into Category A entrants and incumbent: China Telecom is the Category A incumbent
in south of the country, but a Category A entrant in the north. In contrast, China Netcom (now China Unicom) is the
Category A incumbent in the north but a Category A entrant in the south of China. In addition, Category B operators
must also rely on the two incumbents—initially China Telecom, and then China Telecom and China Netcom (now
China Unicom)—for their connection to the Internet outsider China as only they are allowed to construct and operate
international gateways [Tan et al., 1999].
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Figure 1. The Structure of the Internet in China, Post-June 2001 Circular
The motivations for the June 2001 Circular, as stated in its first appendix, are fourfold: firstly, to normalise the
operation of the broadband Network of Residence market; secondly, to encourage fair competition; thirdly, to ensure
the rights and interests of most telecommunications customers; and fourthly, to facilitate the development of the
Internet and broadband services [MII, 2001]. To normalise the operation of the market is interpreted as addressing
the duplication issue. By simply limiting the Category B entrants, the June 2001 Circular tries to control the
duplication of infrastructure by the Category B entrants, but leaves the duplication by the Category A entrants and
incumbents unaddressed. In 2008, seven years after the issuing of the June 2001 Circular, Mr. Jiayi Liu, China’s
Auditor-General, reported to the People’s Congress Standing Committee that there was a large duplication of
investment by the Category A entrants and incumbents [Liu, 2008]. Whether the June 2001 Circular achieves one of
its other aims—to encourage fair competition—is the focus of this article. With this in mind, we will consider operator
strategy in the market structure emerging subsequent to the June 2001 Circular.

IV. MARKET STRUCTURE AND OPERATOR STRATEGY
It is clear from Section 2 (above) that considerable effort has been made to manage the development of competition
in the Chinese telecommunications market. The market has been restructured, albeit several times in an attempt to
find the most appropriate structure, and China has joined the WTO with all that this entails. However, competition in
the broadband market has not developed as anticipated. The restructuring of the telecommunications industry has
created two incumbent operators that remain entrenched within their respective home regions: China Telecom in the
south and China Netcom (now China Unicom) in the north. Significantly, these two companies were also granted an
international gateway duopoly by the government.
The presence of the incumbent operators throughout the network places them in a structurally powerful position
(vertical integration), enabling them to influence how the market develops. To “unfairly” gain market share vertically
integrated incumbents could employ various anti-competitive strategies, the incentives and the theories of which are
discussed in a long strand of industrial organization literatures and have been referred in many antitrust (anticompetition) and regulatory cases [see, for example, Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers, 1994; Laffont and Tirole,
2000; Rey and Tirole, 2007]. One of the most well-known examples of anti-competitive behaviors is that which took
place in the U.S. where a vertically integrated AT&T abused its significant position in the local market to foreclose its
competitors in long-haul service market. Such behaviors ultimately resulted in the Modified Final Judgment that
broke AT&T into eight different companies [Laffont and Tirole, 2000]. A more recent example can be found in the
UK, where the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the telecommunications regulator, wrote that:
… in parts of the network where it is uneconomic for new entrants to build their own infrastructure, competitors
are reliant on BT [British Telecom] to provide wholesale access to its network. Yet those who have relied on BT
to provide such access have to date experienced slow product development, inferior quality wholesale products,
poor transactional processes, and a general lack of transparency [Ofcom, 2005, pp. 19].
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These concerns ultimately led to Ofcom imposing a range of remedies on BT (the vertically integrated incumbent),
including functional separation and equality of access to ensure that other operators who rely on inputs from BT to
deliver their own products are not disadvantaged in any way by BT.
These theoretical, legal, and regulatory debates suggest that the incumbents in China may also be able to act anticompetitively and foreclose their competitors by abusing their powerful vertically integrated structure if unchecked,
since vertically integrated incumbents nearly monopolize the drop sector and are dominant providers in feeder and
distribution sectors, while being the largest domestic Internet backbone providers and being the only two
international gateway providers.
According to Article 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China a business operator may be assumed to have a dominant
market position if one of the following two conditions (among others) are satisfied, namely, that the relevant market
share of a business accounts for more than half of the market, or if the joint relevant market share of two businesses
accounts is two-thirds or more. Thus, if the Anti-Monopoly Law had existed before its enactment in 2008, or applied
to the telecommunications industry since it became effective, the two incumbents would be designated as operators
with dominant market positions in retail broadband, feeder, and distribution sectors, backbone, and international
gateways. According to Article 17, they would be prohibited from engaging in a wide range of anti-competitive
actions by abusing their dominant market position. They would not be able to sell commodities at unfairly high
prices, sell products below cost without a justifiable cause, or refuse to trade with others unless they have a
justifiable cause [NPC, 2007]. Nor would the two incumbents be able to apply differentiated pricing or other
transactional terms on counterparties with equal standing. Figure 2 presents three different situations in which anticompetitive strategies are suspected to occur.

Figure 2. Suspected Anti-Competitive Strategic Behaviors
First, in those REMPAs (Type I) where the vertically integrated incumbent monopolizes the drop sector, the
incumbent could refuse the interconnection requirement of Category A entrants between the incumbent’s drop
sector and Category A entrants’ feeder and distribution sector (refusing to trade). Doing so may enable the
incumbent to extract the whole of the profit as suggested by vertical foreclosure theory [see Armstrong et al., 1994;
Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Rey and Tirole, 2007, for theoretical review and explanation].
Second, in those REPMAs (Type II) where a Category B has already entered the drop sector and whose relevant
feeder and distribution sector is monopolized by the incumbent, the incumbent could reduce the retail price of its
broadband access products and squeeze out Category B entrants, whose critical input was priced and controlled by
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the incumbent (applying differentiated prices or other transactional terms to counterparties with equal standing).
Alternatively, the incumbent could refuse (refusing to trade) or delay to interconnect with Category B operators
categorically using one pretext or another. Moreover, if it did connect with the Category B operator, the incumbent
could degrade the quality of the service that it provides (applying differentiated prices or other transaction terms to
counterparties with equal standing) [see Armstrong et al., 1994; Laffont and Tirole, 2000, for theoretical review and
explanation].
Third, in those REPMAs (Type III) where a Category B operator has already entered the drop sector and in whose
relevant feeder and distribution sector the stronger incumbent competes with a weaker Category A entrant, the
incumbent could refuse to deal, that is, refusing to trade with the Category B operator. Doing so reduces the supply
that the Category B operator could seek, weakens its bargaining power, and thus raises its costs of dealing with the
remaining supplier—the Category A entrant, to such an extent that the Category B operator can not profitably enter
or remain in the market [see, for instance, Ordover et al., 1990; Armstrong et al., 1994; Rey and Tirole, 2007 for a
discussion of the theory of raising the costs of rivals].
The challenge facing Category B entrants outside the thirteen trial cities is arguably worse than those that they face
in the trial cities, as they are not permitted to expand the networks that they had established prior to the June 2001
Circular being issued. As such, they are placed at a significant commercial disadvantage vis-à-vis the Category A
operators that they face. Furthermore, the three different situations outlined above are observable throughout China,
that is, within the north and south of the country, as well as trial and non-trial cities alike, and supported by a
substantial body of anecdotal evidence. With this in mind, the following three subsections will explore the instances
of the aforementioned anti-competitive strategies from the perspectives of market concentration, investment and
pricing.

Market Concentration
New entrants often allege that incumbent operators are acting anti-competitively. Indeed, it could be argued that
such allegations are part of a game waged by the new entrant against the incumbent as it seeks to establish itself in
the marketplace. It is, however, relatively rare for a new entrant to formalize such allegations. For example, while
Wilsdon and Jones [2002] highlight the variety of complaints made by new entrants in the UK against BT, the
incumbent operator, they also demonstrate how few of these were subsequently formalized. It is, therefore, both
unusual and surprising that one Category B operator in northern China decided to formally complain about the
behavior of the incumbent in early 2008. On January 8, 2008, Shandong San Lian Electronics Information Ltd
(Shandong San Lian) complained to Shandong Communications Administration, which is the local arm of the
telecommunications regulator, and again lodged a suit to a local court in January 2008, stating that the incumbent
was acting anti-competitively [Anhui Legal System, 2008]. It argued that in April 2007 Jinan Netcom (the city arm of
China Netcom—now China Unicom, the incumbent in northern China) offered Shandong San Lian customers the
opportunity to spend just CNY600 for a fourteen-month 2Mbps broadband contract if they could produce a
Shandong San Lian receipt. In other words, the incumbent offered the customers of Shandong San Lian a
broadband connection at just CNY42.86 per month, a substantial discount when compared against its normal
charges of CNY150 one-off fee and CNY70 per month. And, if this was not sufficient to entice customers, Jinan
Netcom exempted any customer from the monthly fee in the remaining months if their Shandong San Lian contract
was not terminated when they moved between the two operators [Anhui Legal System, 2008].
Both of these strategies sought to create a price differential by reducing retail prices thus squeezing (foreclosing)
Shandong San Lian, whose essential input is priced by and obtained from Jinan Netcom. It was also alleged that
Jinan Netcom sought to degrade the quality of interconnection between the two companies [Anhui Legal System,
2008]. The Director of Legal Affairs at Shandong San Lian alleged that combined these strategies were designed to
force his company’s exit from the market, thereby enabling Jinan Netcom to raise retail prices to end users in the
longer term [Anhui Legal System, 2008]. It is worth noting that it was Shandong San Lian rather than Jinan Netcom
(now Jinan Unicom) that first provided broadband access in Jinan city. In 2002, Shandong San Lian had
substantially more subscribers than Jinan Netcom, but as a consequence of the suspected anti-competitive
behaviors of Jinan Netcom this has been overturned. In 2002 Shandong San Lian controlled more than half of the
broadband market, yet by the end of 2007 Jinan Netcom was the dominant service provider with almost threequarters of the market.
Due to this reversal in fortune, Shandong San Lian was forced to seek inputs from a Category A entrant, which in
this case was Jinan Telecom (after geographical separation, China Telecom is the incumbent in the south but a
Category A entrant in the north), and ultimately sold its broadband operations to Jinan Telecom for CNY200 million
in March 2008. After the sale of Shandong San Lian to Jinan Telecom, an out-of-court settlement was reached and
the lawsuit subsequently withdrawn (nolle prosequi). This is not unusual, as Zhang and Zhang [2007, p. 195]
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demonstrate in their discussion of the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law, most litigants in China prefer to settle
out of court settlement.
What is surprising here is that Shandong San Lian was forced into initially seeking inputs, and then exiting the
market, in a trial city (Jinan) where it was able to further expand its presence in drop sectors due to its status as a
Category B operator. This suggests that the competitive advantages that accrue from vertically integrated
incumbency are significant and not easily, if at all, discounted by Category B operators. Of greater concern,
however, is the implication of the fate of Shandong San Lian for the prospects of Category B operators outside the
thirteen trial cities. Outside of these cities, Category B operators do not have the option of enhancing their
competitiveness through expanding their own network. In other words, they must continue to rely on the network of
Category A operators when delivering their own services. In doing so, they will remain at the mercy of any anticompetitive strategies that the incumbent chooses to implement and as such their prospects are not rosy—either
they will continue in the market, but with their market share declining, or negotiate to sell their operations from a
position of weakness.
As this example highlights the mechanism leading to the continued concentrated nature of broadband
telecommunication markets, albeit within a specific trial city, an obvious question to ask is whether this is typical of
other markets as well. An internationally used measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), the calculation of which is based on the market share of operators. The Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology and its predecessors have never disclosed nationwide market share for broadband by corporations, let
alone disclose the market share by operators in various regions. In a nation where there are a few geographical
markets and each of regional market is dominated or monopolized by one firm, it would misleadingly underestimate
the market power of each firm if the market share of each regionally dominant firm in the whole nation was used to
calculate HHI as a measure of market power. Instead, HHI as determined by the market share in the regional market
monopolized or dominated by a particular operator provides a better indication of the degree of market power in
these geographical markets [see Hirschey, 2009, ch.13].
Considering the two inherited regional nearly monopoly operators of the fixed line sector in China, it is thus more
appropriate to use the HHI obtained by using market share in the south or north to illustrate the market power in
China. Tables 2 and 3 present the HHI for the northern provinces of China between 2002 and 2007. The incumbent
for this period was the then China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited, the listed subsidiary of China
Netcom Group (now China Unicom). In its annual reports it publishes market share data in the northern provinces
where it provides service, enabling us to calculate both market shares and HHI in that region. When measured by
subscribers, its market share grew from 86.50 percent in 2002 to 95.80 percent in 2004, with the consequence that
HHI also increased from 7665 to 9195 over the same period.
Chinese operators adopted a strategy of creating a listed subsidiary that controlled their most profitable regional
operations within China. The less profitable operations were retained by the parent company, thereby maximizing
the amount of capital that would be raised when the subsidiary was listed on the overseas stock market. Over time,
however, the listed subsidiaries have acquired more of the operations of the parent company [Fan, 2005]. China
Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited took over the assets from its parent company China Netcom Group
in four provinces in 2005 [China Netcom, 2006]. This takeover suggests that the HHIs after 2005 inclusive are
indicators of a geographically wider market than those before 2005. That is, that the HHIs of 2002–2004 and those
of 2005–2007 are not comparable. Having said this, the significant increase in HHI for 2002–2004 indicates that the
market became highly concentrated during these three years. In other words, its dominant position in the broadband
market increased. A significant factor contributing to this is illustrated by the aforementioned case of Shandong San
Lian, namely, the incumbent’s willingness and ability to affect a squeezing strategy (foreclosure) on new entrants in
order to weaken future competition. Table 3 also shows that in the subsequent period from 2005 to 2007 the HHI
increased slightly, suggesting that the incumbent was dominant and competition was weak during this period.
Taking the history of a series of restructuring in China’s telecommunications industry into account, the market
framework in the south is similar to that in the north. China Telecom, as the regional incumbent inherited the near
monopoly of fixed lines in the south. As to the market power enjoyed by China Telecom, the incumbent in the south,
we cannot obtain the HHI time-series due to a lack of available data. China Telecom Corporation Limited—the listed
subsidiary of China Telecom Group—disclosed its broadband market share only for 2004 in a series of annual
reports. In 2004, it controlled 92.6 percent (HHI = 8630) of the market in the areas where it provided service and
strengthened its leading position [China Telecom, 2005, p. 14, Chinese version]. According to its 2003 annual report,
it had strengthened its leading position in the broadband market. Further, its procurement cost of broadband
equipment had decreased 20 percent in 2003 compared to those in 2002 [China Telecom, 2004, pp. 12–13, Chinese
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Table 2: The Changes in APRU of China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited
2001–2004 (inclusive)
Revenue Subscriber Reported
Estimated (CNY)
Market
Year
HHI
(CNY bn) (million)
ARPU (CNY)
APRU L
APRU M
APRU H
share
2001
1.384
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2002
2.468
0.577
N/A
356.2
N/A
N/A
0.865
7482
2003
2.815
3.346
N/A
70.1
119.6
406.3
0.892
7957
2004
5.033
8.482
N/A
49.4
70.9
125.3
0.958
9178
N/A = not available
Source: The figures of revenue, subscribers, reported ARPU and market share are from China Netcom Corporation
(Hong Kong) Limited (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008); The figures of ARPU (estimated) are calculated by the authors
by drawing these figures obtained from China Netcom Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited (2005, 2006, 2007, and
2008).
Table 3: The Changes in APRU of China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited
2005–2007 (inclusive)
Revenue
Estimated (CNY)
Subscriber Reported
Market
Year
HHI
(CNY bn)
(million)
ARPU (CNY)
APRU L
APRU M
APRU H
share
2005
7.289
11.036
N/A
55.0
N/A
N/A
0.876
7674
2006
9.916
14.429
66.3
57.3
64.9
74.9
0.875
7656
2007
13.835
19.768
67.4
58.3
67.4
79.9
0.889
7903
N/A = not available
Source: The figures of revenue, subscribers, reported ARPU and market share are from China Netcom Corporation
(Hong Kong) Limited (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008); The figures of ARPU (estimated) are calculated by the authors
by drawing these figures obtained from China Netcom Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited (2005, 2006, 2007, and
2008).
version]. According to its 2007 annual report, it was the leading provider [China Telecom, 2008, p. 3, Chinese
version]. The market share data of 2003 and the description in its 2003 and 2007 annual reports strongly indicate
that similar incentives of foreclosing Category B entrants by China Telecom exist. The market concentration should
be comparable to that in the north. If not, and this is unlikely, the issue of the incumbent’s anti-competitive behaviors
and the high degree of market concentration in the northern parts of China presents a significant policy issue that
needs to be addressed.

Investment
Mainstream microeconomic theory, as outlined by Pindyck and Rubinfeld [2005], for example, states that one
possible consequence of an operator being dominant in the marketplace is underproduction through less investment
than if it were in a competitive market. This does not mean that a monopolist will reduce the investment in absolute
terms. In order to obtain maximum profit, it will control output—through increasing or decreasing investment—at
such a level so that its marginal cost is equal to its marginal revenue, which may increase or decrease as demand
shifts. This type of underproduction is, according to theory, suboptimal socially, and the dominant operator’s
efficiency is not aligned with the public interest. Although the information that is in the public domain is limited, it is
possible to comment on whether operators have increased or decreased their investment in broadband
infrastructure and content. China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited, for example, has increased its
investment in broadband access and content in recent years. In 2005 it invested CNY7.3 billion in broadband, which
was a slight increase on the amount invested in 2004, while broadband related capital expenditure grew from
CNY3.6 billion to CNY4.9 billion between 2005 and 2006 [China Netcom Group, 2007]. Significantly, the proportion
of total capital expenditure accounted for by broadband increased over the same period, thereby demonstrating its
significance as a market to the company.
Such significant investment, however, has not resulted in the quickened pace of the delivery of faster products. For
instance, up until 2007 China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited did not offer any DSL-based products
with a broadband speed of 8Mbps anywhere in China [China Netcom Group, 2008]. In September 2009, the fastest
DSL mass market product available in Beijing was 8Mbps. This does not compare favorably with speeds in other
major international cities: as Table 4 shows, substantially faster DSL-based products are available in Berlin, London,
Moscow, Paris, Riyadh, Roman, Singapore, and Tokyo. Although there are several plausible explanations for the
significant difference in broadband speeds between Beijing and the other cities mentioned, one possible explanation
is that the investment that has been undertaken in China has focused on the geographical expansion of the network
rather than on the provision of faster access speeds. As lower-speed DSL-based products do not require the
extension of back-haul fibers, the incumbent operators are able to utilize the lower marginal costs of lower-speed
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DSL-based products to efficiently add new subscribers to their networks. As a consequence, the incumbents are
able to strengthen their position in the marketplace. However, the incumbent’s efficiency is not aligned with the
public interest, as the speeds of products provided by the incumbent are below those demanded by a significant
portion of Chinese Internet users. A series of semi-annual Statistical Reports on the Internet Development in China
released by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) show that a significant proportion of users are
unhappy with the speed of access that they are receiving. In July 2007, for example, only 47.1 percent of those
surveyed were happy with the access speed that they received [CNNIC, 2007, p. 44, English version].
Table 4: Illustrative Incumbents’ DSL Broadband Products in Select Cities (September 2009)
Product2
Subscription
Subscription
City
Operator
US$/Mbps
Local
US$5
Mbps
Sao Paulo
Telecom Brazil
0.256
49.9
27.1
105.8
Beijing
China Unicom1
0.512
129
18.9
36.9
New Delhi
BSNL
0.512
1125
23.1
45.1
Buenos Aires Telecom Argentina
1
59.9
15.6
15.6
Washington
Verizon
1
19.99
20.0
20.0
Beijing
China Unicom1
1
138
20.2
20.2
Paris
France Telecom4
1
24.9
35.6
35.6
Riyadh
STC
1
150
40.1
40.1
New Delhi
BSNL
1
3078
63.1
63.1
Beijing
China Unicom1
2
168
24.6
12.3
Berlin
Deutsch Telecom3
2
29.95
42.8
21.4
Mexico City
Telmex
2
999
74.8
37.4
Singapore
Singapore Telecom
3
27.9
19.4
6.5
Beijing
China Unicom1
4
258
37.8
9.4
Buenos Aires Telecom Argentina
5
95
24.7
4.9
Rome
Italia Telecom
7
19.95
28.5
4.1
Washington
Verizon
7.1
39.99
40.0
5.6
Tokyo
NTT EAST
8
2782
29.9
3.7
Sao Paulo
Telecom Brazil
8
99.9
54.2
6.8
Riyadh
STC
8
240
64.2
8.0
Beijing
China Unicom1
8
498
72.9
9.1
Moscow
COMSTAR
10
800
25.3
2.5
Singapore
Singapore Telecom
15
59.9
41.7
2.8
Berlin
Deutsch Telecom
16
49.95
71.4
4.5
Paris
France Telecom
18
39.9
57.1
3.2
Moscow
COMSTAR
20
1000
31.7
1.6
Rome
Italia Telecom
20
24.95
35.7
1.8
London
British Telecom
20
24.46
40.1
2.0
Riyadh
STC
20
310
82.7
4.1
Tokyo
NTT EAST
47
2940
31.6
0.7
1 = China Unicom acquired China Netcom in the latest restructuring completed in late 2008 and early
2009.
2 = The products with unlimited usage are chosen.
3 = The price of 2Mbps of Deutsch Telecom includes unlimited domestic calls.
4 = The price of 1Mbps of France Telecom includes unlimited TV and that of 18Mbps of France
Telecom includes unlimited domestic calls.
5 = The exchange rates are used to convert the monthly subscriptions to US dollar. Those exchange
rates are adopted on www.ft.com except that of Saudi Arabia that is adopted from
www.ameinfo.com/currency/ on September 6, 2009.
Source: Complied by the authors from the websites of operators involved.

Pricing
The high concentration of a market often results in the dominant company imposing higher prices onto the market.
Table 4 presents the broadband access prices in select cities. In Table 4, broadband prices are organized by speed
and then, where there are multiple examples of the same speed, by price in U.S. dollars per Mbps. To facilitate
comparison, only recurring monthly subscriptions charges of the incumbent’s DSL-based products with unlimited
usage are included. Beijing, which is dominated by China Unicom (formerly China Netcom), is among the most
expensive cities in the world. For example, subscribers in Beijing pay $72.92 per month for a broadband connection
with a speed of 8Mbps. With almost the same budget, it is possible to subscribe to much higher speed products in
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Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Singapore, Tokyo, and Washington. For the entry-level 1Mbps product, the
price is higher in Beijing than in Buenos Aires or Washington. There would also appear to be a relationship between
price per Mbps and the position of China Unicom (formerly China Netcom) internationally. As speeds increase,
China Unicom becomes more expensive and thus compares less favorably with the foreign cities listed on Table 4.
The high prices are due to the lack of competition. This observation is corroborated by a report released in August
2010 by The Department of Information Research of The State Information Centre of China. The report found that
nationally the average monthly broadband access charge per subscriber in 2008 was 83.8 RMB. This amounts to
46.6 RMB (US$6.7) per Mbps per month, or eighteen times the figure in South Korea (US$0.37) and 51.5 times the
figure in Japan (US$0.13) [State Information Centre, 2010].
If a company does not feel the effects of competitive pressures in a market, it is able to leave its retail prices largely
unchanged. (It is, however, worth noting that there is a possibility that, in order to maximize aggregate profits, the
incumbent may adjust prices of existing products after or when the incumbent introduces similar but not identical
products onto the market. For a discussion of the theory on price discrimination by dominant firms see, for example,
Church and Ware [2000: Chapter 5]). Table 5 shows the average first-year monthly cost to a subscriber who had a
fixed line with the incumbent prior to taking a twelve-month broadband contract in the large northern Chinese cities.
Besides monthly subscription, the table takes into account one-off installation fees as well as other charges and
spreads them over the yearlong contract period. While some data may be missing and some data of higher-speed
products unavailable in the years before they were introduced onto the market, it is clear from Table 5 that although
retail prices declined substantially between 2002 and 2004, since then their decline has slowed or effectively
ceased. We can see from Beijing that the price of the slowest speed product has fallen just once, in the year after its
introduction, and has remained stable from 2003 onward. In subsequent years, faster products have been
introduced, but they have also seen only minimal price reductions. Thus, not only are DSL-based products
comparatively slow to emerge onto the market, especially when compared internationally, but also prices do not
appear to be subject to either competitive or regulatory downward pressures. As DSL equipment costs did decrease
over this period, the end result would appear to be a widening of the margins as acknowledged in China Netcom
Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited’s own annual reports [China Netcom Group, 2006 and 2007].
In some cities, such as Beijing and Tianjin, prices have been more or less stable between 2005 and 2009, while in
other cities, like Qingdao, there has been a slight increase, and in Shijiazhuang there has been a slight decline. If we
consider the reduced cost of equipment and the incumbent’s possible strategy of adjusting the price of existing
products after it introduces similar but not identical products in order to maximize aggregate profits, such price
changes support the suggestion that the incumbent, through implementing pricing or non-pricing strategies between
2002 and 2004, was able to enhance its position in the marketplace to such an extent that only marginal changes
were required in subsequent years. An interesting city is Shenyang, where prices did decrease quite substantially.
One possible explanation could be the presence of competition, while a second is that the incumbent’s local arm in
Shenyang is implementing its price reduction strategy later than the incumbent’s local arms elsewhere in other cities.
Regardless, the unusual nature of developments in Shenyang merits further investigation.
Average revenue per unit (ARPU) is a commonly used measure to show how much revenue each subscriber
(broadband subscriber in this case) generates on a monthly basis. ARPU data for the northern provinces that China
Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited served are a better proxy for the overall price level in terms of
representativeness of the entire geographical market we are interested in than are the individual prices of selected
products in several cities when an incumbent provides multiple products. To observe the relationship of ARPU and
HHI of the same periods enhances the robustness of our analysis (above). Tables 2 and 3 show ARPU levels for
China Netcom Group Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited. ARPU L in Tables 2 and 3 is calculated by dividing the
broadband revenue of a given year by the number of total broadband subscribers at the end of that year and then
dividing by twelve, whereas ARPU H is obtained by dividing the broadband revenue of a given year by the number
of total subscribers at the end of its previous year and then dividing by twelve. ARPU M is achieved by dividing the
broadband revenue of a given year by the average of the numbers of the given and previous year, then dividing by
twelve.
The weighted ARPU, which cannot be calculated as monthly subscriber data and are not available, should be
located between APRU L and H and is likely to be located between APRU L and M due to stronger demand in the
second half of each year in China. All three measures of ARPU fall between 2002 and 2004, but then remain stable
thereafter. Since no market share data for years prior to 2002 are available and the market share data of 2002–2007
(inclusive) in the public domain is yearly, we unfortunately do not have a sufficient number of observations to support
a regression analysis of the relationship between HHI and price. Having said this, Tables 2 and 3 do point toward
the following hypothesis: that the strategies adopted by the incumbent initially squeezed its competitors by reducing
its retail prices, as well as by other anti-competitive behaviors discussed in previous sections. These strategies
resulted in the market’s HHI increasing between 2002 and 2004 and weakened the future competition, since

Volume 28
622

Article 36

competitors were squeezed. Subsequently, after the market had been further concentrated and competition had
been weakened in favor of the incumbent, it was able to maintain prices and slightly increase its market share
between 2005 and 2007. To date we have not found any data or evidence to categorically falsify this hypothesis.
Table 5: Average Per Month Cost (CNY) in the First Year of Broadband Products
of China Netcom in Illustrated Northern Cities
City
Product
Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009
Beijing*
512Kbps
190
145
145 145
145
145
145
145
1Mbps
175 175
175
163
163
163
2Mbps
213
193
193
4Mbps
283
283
283
8Mbps
523
523
Tianjin
512Kbps
136.7
117
117
1Mbps
247
247
2Mbps
347
347
4Mbps
437
437
Changchun
512Kbps
83.3
75
1Mbps
125
83.3
83.3
83.3
70.4
1.5Mbps
108
108
90
2Mbps
117
108.3
3Mbps
116.7
4Mbps
133.3
Shenyang
512Kbps
108
108
108
96.3
73.3
1Mbps
128
128
98.3
75
2Mbps
236
118
83.3
3Mbps
91.6
4Mbps
100
Dalian
512Kbps
66.7
65
66.7
66.7
1Mbps
120
65
75
75
2Mbps
91.7
91.7
Shijiangzhuang 512Kbps
95
75
60
60
2Mbps
75
50
50
Jinan*
768Kbps
40
47.3
52.1
53.3
1Mbps
58.3
58.3
73.3
2Mbps
60
67.3
60.8
73.3
88.3
3Mbps
88.3
88.3
103.3
4Mbps
148.3
Qingdao*
512Kbps
141.7
86.8
93
93
1Mbps
109
115
115
115
2Mbps
159
165
3Mbps
213
Those cities marked with * are among the 13 cities stipulated in the June 2001 Circular. China
Netcom was taken over by China Unicom in the late 2008 and early of 2009; In addition to
monthly subscription, other costs including one-off installation fee and/or DSL modem charge
are considered in this table.
Source: Collected and calculated by the authors from a variety of Internet sources
Rather, drawing on industrial organization theories relating to the anti-competitive foreclosure strategies of vertically
integrated incumbents, the market framework resulting from the restructuring and the June 2001 Circular, and
investment and pricing activity described above all support the aforementioned hypothesis.

V. CABLE SYSTEMS AND THIRD GENERATION MOBILE
Technologically, cable television network, if updated, can provide broadband services. In some parts of the world,
such as in the U.S., cable operators are the main rivals to telecommunications operators. In China, The Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (and its predecessors) oversees the telecommunications industry, but the
cable operators network industry is under another ministerial-level agency—The State Administration of Radio, Film
and Television, or SARFT. In January 2010, The State Council of China declared that it would promote the
convergence of telecommunications, the Internet and cable television [Wang, 2010]. This announcement repealed a
Circular issued in 1999 that prohibited cable systems from entering telecommunications markets and vice versa
Volume 28

Article 36

623

[General Office of the State Council, 1999]. The ministries involved have selected trial cities, which are presently in
the process of developing these trials, where cable operators will be allowed to provide broadband service and
telecommunications operators IPTV. Given the propensity of China to trial before acting [Gao and Lyytinen, 2000], a
plausible speculative conclusion is that, in due course, these trials will be extended to other parts of China. The
updating of cable systems requires considerable time and resources, and this may not happen on a significant scale
for several years. However, the declaration of The State Council to promote convergence has brought about
proactive reactions by incumbents to potential competition from cable systems. On March 17, 2010, The Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology, National Development and Reform Commission, and five other ministries or
ministerial-level agencies jointly issued the Announcement on Promoting Optical Broadband Network Rollout,
stipulating a target that by the end of 2011 the average bandwidth of broadband residential subscribers in urban
area should reach 8Mbps, 2Mbps in rural area, and 100Mbps for business customers [MIIT et al., 2010].
The announcement and joint ministerial intervention suggest that competition has not developed as anticipated. Not
only are there fewer than expected companies operating in the broadband market, but the products that they offer
are deemed to be unsatisfactory. Evidence is beginning to emerge to suggest that broadband operators are
amending their strategies; in May 2010 it was reported that China Telecom Group would update its plans so that
12Mbps and not 4Mbps speed connections would be available to 70 percent of towns [Economic Reference Daily,
2010]. Time and resources aside, the pace of broadband provision by cable systems critically depends on the
interconnection of cable systems with the outside of China through nationwide backbone and international gateways,
which are either dominated or duopolized by the incumbents. According to the analysis in Section IV, incumbents
may have incentives and capabilities to foreclose cable systems.
The third-generation (3G) mobile licenses were awarded to the three main operators at the beginning of 2009. This
licensing followed the latest restructuring that was announced in May 2008 and completed in January 2009. The
effect of this latest restructuring and 3G licensing on broadband is not clear-cut. It may increase competition among
the remaining three nationwide operators through inter-platform (3G versus fixed broadband) or intra-platform (fixed
broadband versus fixed broadband) through creating bundling service (3G, fixed broadband, and so forth).
The competition among the remaining three nationwide operators may be enhanced. The prospect of Category B
entrants seems more obscure than previously. On the one hand, the restructuring has consolidated backbone and
municipality access network market. It edges the Category B entrants toward a more weakened position. If no
intervention emerges, the anti-competitive strategic behaviors employed by incumbents may continue to squeeze
Category B entrants out of the market. The 3G licensing, which was not by an auction, provides three nationwide
operators a new competitive weapon—the ability to bundle fixed broadband with landline and 3G (mobile). This
horizontal integration may force those Category B entrants, who were not granted 3G licenses by the regulators, to
exit the market if no further interventions are made. Fu [2010], a blogger officially working for Shenzhen Media
Group that runs the local cable system in Shenzhen City, quoted a research report published by Guideline
Research, a consulting company specializing in digital television and marketing research, that there had been only
2.31m cable modem broadband subscribers in China by March 2009 (compared to 88.13m for the two incumbents
combined). More recently, in January 2010, cable broadband subscribers accounted for less than 3 percent of the
market nationally. Apart from the cable television operators’ own issues, such as insufficient resources, Fu [2010]
identified the bundling strategy of incumbents as one of the reasons that cable operators have lost market share in
the broadband market to telecommunications operators. The broadband market share of Shenzhen Media Group
quickly decreased from 33 percent in 2006 to 7.5 percent in 2009. We have already discussed one of the other
reasons identified by Fu [2010], namely, the dependence of cable operators on the incumbents when
interconnecting with the Internet backbone. It indicates that the incumbents might abuse its vertical integration
advantage and horizontal bundling with mobile services to foreclose cable operators. These perverse incentives
have to be addressed in one way or another in order to promote convergence declared by the State Council.

VI. CONCLUSION
The growth of broadband in China and the central role that it plays as a means to access the Internet, raises the
issue as to whether or not the market could be protected from the anti-competitive behaviors of incumbents. If the
market could be developed competitively, then consumers will be able to enjoy wide ranging benefits: prices would
fall, new products would be regularly launched onto the market, and subscribers would be able to move freely
between service providers. We have shown that there is a gap between the announced policy objective of promoting
competition and the reality of developments in the broadband sector.
It has also been shown that the incumbents are suspected of foreclosing Category B entrants. Although the market
has been restructured several times to enhance competition, the restructuring in 2002 and the June 2001 Circular
created a market structure in which the two incumbent operators have incentives to act anti-competitively. That
China Telecom and China Netcom (now China Unicom) remain dominant in the delivery of broadband services of
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their respective areas after a series of restructurings is somewhat surprising, given that restructurings were
underpinned by a desire on the part of the government to enhance competition across the telecommunications
industry. As recently as 7 May 2010, The State Council of China issued a Circular, stating:
[The State] shall encourage the private sector to take part in investing in telecommunications construction. [The
State] shall encourage private capital to enter the basic telecommunications service markets as shareholders.
[The State] shall support private capital to operate value added services. [The State] shall strengthen the
supervision of telecommunications monopoly and anti-competitive behaviors. [The State] shall facilitate fair
competition and promote the share of resources [State Council, 2010].
So far industry-wide restructurings have failed to deliver a more competitive broadband sector. This failing indicates
that restructuring alone cannot guarantee or promote sustained competition. Indeed, restructuring needs to be
complemented by other measures that counteract or deter the anti-competitive behavior of incumbent operators with
market power and ensure that new entrants are placed on an equal footing with them. One such mechanism might
be to impose some form of disintegration on the dominant broadband providers in a similar fashion to the UK’s
imposition of functional separation on BT. Though short of ownership separation, this would enable Category B
entrants to access the infrastructure of the two dominant providers on a more equitable footing.
In addition to ex ante regulation, another mechanism would be to apply China’s anti-monopoly law, which has been
in force since August 2008, to the telecommunications industry. The enforcement of the anti-monopoly law with
serious ex post penalties may be able to protect the market from being abused by two dominant operators through
using their vertical (now horizontal as well) integration anti-competitively. How to effectively apply the Anti-Monopoly
Law deserves further research, not least because some of the literature mentioned in Section 2 casts doubt on the
overall effectiveness of the law. Either option would require a more detailed analysis of the Chinese
telecommunications market to be undertaken, thereby moving away from the macro-level discussion associated
with, say, Fan [2005] or Gao and Lyytinen [2000], toward one that identifies the enduring bottlenecks within the
network that are central to the anti-competitive behaviors of the two dominant operators. This move away from the
macro-level indicates that further research, at the city or sub-city geographical scale, is needed to expand and
deepen our knowledge of the structure and nature of competition in China’s telecommunications industry.
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